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A distributed (preconditioned) projected–reflected–gradient algorithm
for stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems
Barbara Franci and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equi-
librium problem (SGNEP) with joint feasibility constraints
and expected–value cost functions. We propose a distributed
stochastic preconditioned projected reflected gradient algorithm
and show its almost sure convergence when the pseudogradient
mapping is cocoercive. The algorithm is based on monotone op-
erator splitting methods for SGNEPs when the expected–value
pseudogradient mapping is approximated at each iteration via
an increasing number of samples of the random variable, an
approach known as sample average approximation. Finally,
we show that a non-preconditioned variant of our proposed
algorithm has less restrictive convergence guarantees than state-
of-the-art (preconditioned) forward-backward algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems
(SGNEPs) have received some attention from the system
and control community [1], [2], [3]. In a SGNEP, a
set of agents interacts with the aim of minimizing their
expected-value cost functions while subject to some joint
feasibility constraints. The main feature is that both the cost
function and the constraints are uncertain and depend on the
strategies chosen by the other agents. Stochastic equilibrium
problems arise when there is some uncertainty, modelled
via a random variable with an unknown distribution. One
main reason for the interest is related to their possible
applications. For instance, any networked Cournot game
with market capacity constraints and uncertainty in the
demand can be modelled as a SGNEP [4], [5]. Other
applications can be found in transportation systems, where
the drivers perception of travel time is a possible source of
uncertainty [6], and in electricity markets where companies
schedule their energy production without fully knowing the
demand [7].
Now, if the random variable is known, the expected–
value formulation can be solved via a standard technique for
deterministic GNEPs [8], [9]. Similarly to the deterministic
case, one possible approach for SGNEPs is to recast the
problem as a stochastic variational inequality (SVI) through
the use of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. Then, the
problem can be rewritten as a monotone inclusion and solved
via operator splitting techniques. Besides the fact that we
use the algorithm to find a SGNE, the difficulty in the
stochastic case is that the pseudogradient is usually not
directly accessible, for instance because the expected value
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is hard or expensive to compute. For this reason, in many
situations, the search for a solution of a SVI relies on samples
of the random variable.
Two are the main approximation schemes used in the
literature: the stochastic approximation (SA) and the sample
average approximation (SAA). In the first case, the approxi-
mation is done by using only one realization of the random
variable. SA was first presented in [10], it is computationally
less expensive than SAA but usually it requires stronger
assumptions on the pseudogradient mapping and on the
parameters [2], [11], [12]. The second approximation scheme
takes instead an increasing number of samples at every
iteration. SAA has the disadvantage of being computationally
costly but it requires weaker assumptions to ensure conver-
gence [13], [14].
Depending on the monotonicity assumptions on the pseu-
dogradient mapping or the affordable computational com-
plexity, there are different algorithms that can be used to
find a SGNE. Among others, one can consider the stochastic
preconditioned forward–backward (SpFB) algorithm [15]
which is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium under
cocoercivity of the pseudogradient and by demanding one
projection step per iteration. However, cocoercivity is not
the weakest possible assumption, therefore one would like
to have an algorithm that converges under mere monotonic-
ity. For instance, the stochastic forward–backward–forward
(SFBF) algorithm involves only one projection step per iter-
ation but two costly evaluation of the pseudogradient map-
ping [13]. Another alternative is the stochastic extragradient
(SEG) algorithm whose iterates are characterized by two
projection steps and two evaluation of the pseudogradient
mapping which may be expensive [14]. To summarize, hav-
ing weaker assumptions comes at the price of implementing
computationally expensive algorithms.
In this paper, we propose a stochastic preconditioned
projected reflected gradient (SpPRG) algorithm for SGNEPs.
The basic, deterministic version of this algorithm was first
presented for variational inequalities by Malitsky in [16] and
then extended to the stochastic case by Cui and Shanbhag
in [11], [17]. Here, we consider the algorithm in [17] that
uses the SAA scheme. The convergence of the algorithm is
guaranteed when the pseudogradient mapping is monotone
and “weak sharp”, a property that we discuss in Section
V. Unfortunately, the latter property is not trivial to check
on the problem data. Therefore, to cope with SGNEPs,
we assume that the pseudogradient mapping is cocoercive.
Furthermore, in order to make our algorithm distributed,
we exploit a suitable preconditioning. We also show that if
the equilibrium solution is unique, then mere monotonicity
(as opposed to cocoercivity) is sufficient for convergence
and preconditioning is not required. We enphasize that this
is the first time that the PRG algorithm is designed for
SGNEPs. Remarkably, under uniqueness of the solution,
our algorithm has convergence guaranteed also for merely
monotone pseudogradient mappings. This is a significant
advantage compared to the SpFB which may not converge
in that case. See Section VII for an example.
Notation: 〈·, ·〉 : Rn×Rn → R denotes the standard inner
product and ‖·‖ is the associated euclidean norm. We indicate
that a matrix A is positive definite, i.e., x⊤Ax > 0, with
A ≻ 0. A ⊗ B indicates the Kronecker product between
A and B. Given a symmetric Φ ≻ 0, the Φ-induced inner
product is 〈x, y〉Φ = 〈Φx, y〉 and the associated norm is
defined as ‖x‖Φ =
√
〈Φx, x〉. 0m indicates the vector with
m entries all equal to 0. Given x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn,x :=
col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
. JF = (Id+F )
−1 is
the resolvent of the operator F where Id is the identity
operator. For a closed set C ⊆ Rn, the mapping projC :
Rn → C denotes the projection onto C, i.e., projC(x) =
argminy∈C ‖y − x‖. ιC is the indicator function of the
set C, that is, ιC(x) = 1 if x ∈ C and ιC(x) = 0
otherwise. The set-valued mapping NC : R
n → Rn denotes
the normal cone operator of the set C , i.e., NC(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ C,
{
v ∈ Rn| supz∈C v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise.
For all x, y ∈ C, a mapping F : C ⊆ Rn → Rn is:
pseudomonotone if (x−y)TF (y) ≥ 0⇒ (x−y)TF (x) ≥ 0;
monotone if (F (x) − F (y))T (x − y) ≥ 0 [18, Def. 2.3.1];
maximally monotone if there exists no monotone operator
G : C → Rn such that the graph of G properly contains
the graph of F [19, Def. 20.20]; β-cocoercive if for β > 0
(F (x)−F (y))T (x−y) ≥ β‖F (x)−F (y)‖2 [18, Def. 2.3.9];
L-Lipschitz continuous if for L > 0 ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤
L ‖x− y‖ [19, Def. 1.47].
II. STOCHASTIC GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PROBLEM
A. Problem Setup
We consider a set of agents I = {1, . . . , N}, each of
them choosing its decision variable xi ∈ Rni from its local
decision set Ωi ⊆ Rni . The aim of each agent is to minimize
its local cost function Ji : R
n → R defined as
Ji(xi,x−i) := Eξ[Ji(xi,x−i, ξ(ω))]
for some measurable function Ji : R
n × Rd → R and
n =
∑N
i=1 ni. We note that the cost function depends on
the local variable xi, on the decisions of the other agents
x−i = col((xj)j 6=i) and on the random variable ξ(ω).
Specifically, the random variable ξ : Ξ → Rd expresses the
fact that there is some uncertainty in the cost function, given
the associated probability space (Ξ,F ,P). Eξ represents the
mathematical expectation with respect to the distribution of
ξ1. We assume that E[Ji(x, ξ)] is well defined for all the
feasible x = col(x1, . . . , xN ).
1For brevity, we use ξ instead of ξ(ω), ω ∈ Ξ, and E instead of Eξ .
The cost function should satisfy some assumptions, postu-
lated next, to make our analysis possible. Such assumptions
are standard for (stochastic) Nash equilibrium problems [1].
Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i the func-
tion Ji(·,x−i) is convex and continuously differentiable. For
each i ∈ I and ξ ∈ Ξ, the function Ji(·,x−i, ξ) is convex,
Lipschitz continuous, and continuously differentiable. The
function Ji(xi,x−i, ·) is measurable and for each x−i, its
Lipschitz constant ℓi(x−i, ξ) is integrable in ξ. 
Since we consider a SGNEP, we introduce affine shared
constraints, Ax ≤ b. Thus, we denote each agent i ∈ I
feasible decision set with the set-valued mapping
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi | Aiyi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj
}
, (1)
where each Ai ∈ Rm×ni indicates how agent i is involved in
the coupling constraints and b ∈ Rm. The collective feasible
set can be then written as
X = Ω ∩ {y ∈ Rn|Ay − b ≤ 0m} (2)
where Ω =
∏N
i=1 Ωi and A = [A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ R
m×n. We
suppose that there is no uncertainty in the constraints.
Standard assumptions for the constraints sets are postu-
lated next [20].
Assumption 2: For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is nonempty,
compact and convex. The set X satisfies Slater’s constraint
qualification. 
The aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of
the other agents x−i, is to choose a decision xi, that solves
its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b −
∑N
j 6=i Ajxj .
(3)
From a game-theoretic perspective, we aim at computing a
stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) [1].
Definition 1: A collective variable x∗ ∈ X is a stochastic
generalized Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ I:
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x
∗
−i) | y ∈ Xi(x
∗
−i)}.
In other words, a SGNE is a vector of strategies where none
of the agents can decrease its cost function by unilaterally
deviating from its decision variable.
When Assumptions 1-2 hold, existence of a SGNE of the
game in (3) is guaranteed by [1, §3.1] but uniqueness does
not hold in general [1, §3.2].
Among all the possible Nash equilibria, we focus on those
that are also solutions of an associated (stochastic) variational
inequality. First let us define the pseudogradient mapping as
F(x) = col (E[∇xiJi(xi,x−i)]i∈I) , (4)
where the exchange between the expected value and the
gradient is possible because of Assumption 1 [1, Lem. 3.4].
Then, the stochastic variational inequality SVI(X ,F) is the
problem of finding x∗ ∈ X such that
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X . (5)
with F(x) as in (4) and X as in (1). We also note that any
solution of SVI(X ,F) is a SGNE of the game in (3) while
the opposite does not hold in general. In fact, a game may
have a Nash equilibrium while the associated VI may have
no solution [21, Prop. 12.7].
Remark 1: Under Assumptions 1-2, the solution set of
SVI(X ,F) is non empty and compact, i.e. SOL(X ,F) 6= ∅
[18, Corollary 2.2.5]. 
B. Operator-theoretic characterization
In this section, we rewrite the SGNEP as a monotone
inclusion, i.e., the problem of finding a zero of a set-valued
monotone operator.
To this aim, we characterize the SGNE of the game in
terms of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the
coupled optimization problems in (3). For each agent i ∈ I,
let us denote with λi ∈ Rm≥0 the dual variable associated with
the coupling constraints. Then, the Lagrangian function, for
every i ∈ I, is given by Li (x, λi) := Ji(xi,x−i)+ιΩi (xi)+
λ⊤i (Ax− b). It holds that the set of strategies x
∗ is a SGNE
if and only if the following KKT conditions are satisfied [22,
Th. 4.6]:
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i, ξ)] + NΩi (x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λi
0 ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(6)
Similarly, a variational SGNE (v-SGNE) can be character-
ized by using the KKT conditions associated to the SVI in
(5) [22, Proposition 1.2.1]. The associated KKT optimality
conditions reads as
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i, ξ)] + NΩi (x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ,
0 ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(7)
The connection between the KKT conditions in (7) and a
v-SGNE is summarized next.
From [20, Th. 3.1], it follows that if x∗ is a solution of
SVI(X ,F) at which the KKT conditions (7) hold, then x∗
is a solution of the SGNEP at which the KKT conditions
(6) hold with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN = λ∗. Viceversa, if x∗
is a solution of the SGNEP at which KKT conditions (6)
hold with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN = λ∗, x∗ is a solution of
SVI(X ,F) in (5). In words, [20, Th. 3.1] says that variational
equilibria are those such that the shared constraints have the
same dual variable for all the agents.
III. DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC PRECONDITIONED
PROJECTED REFLECTED GRADIENT ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a distributed stochastic pre-
conditioned projected reflected gradient (SpPRG) algorithm
for finding a v-SGNE of the game in (3). The iterations
are presented in Algorithm 1 which is inspired by [17],
[16]. For each agent i, the variables xki , z
k
i and λ
k
i denote
the local variables xi, zi and λi at the iteration time k
while αi, νi and σi are the step sizes. We note that agents
can equivalently share the already computed dual variable
λ˜ = col(λ˜1, . . . , λ˜N ) or only λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ) and
let the receiving agent do the computation. In any case,
the number of times that the agents communicate is the
same. Since we want the algorithm to be distributed, we
assume that each agent i only knows its local data, i.e.,
Algorithm 1 Distributed Stochastic Forward–Backward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Updates
x˜ki = 2x
k
i − x
k−1
i
λ˜ki = 2λ
k
i − λ
k−1
i
(2): Receives x˜kj for j ∈ N
h
i and λ
k
j for j ∈ N
λ
i then
updates:
xk+1i = projΩi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(x˜
k
i , x˜
k
−i, ξ
k
i )−A
⊤
i λ
k
i )]
zk+1i = z
k
i + vi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
(3): Receives x˜k+1j for j ∈ N
h
i and z
k+1
j , λ˜
k
j for all j ∈ N
λ
i
then updates:
λk+1i = projRm+
[
λki + σi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − x
k
i )− bi
)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j
(
2(zk+1i − z
k+1
j )− (z
k
i − z
k
j )
)
− σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )
]
Ωi, Ai and bi. Moreover, each player is able to compute
E[∇xiJi(xi,x−i, ξ)], given the collective decision x. Since
the expected value can be hard to evaluate, users compute an
approximation (we give more details later on). We assume
therefore that each agent has access to all the decision
variables that affect its pseudogradient. These information
are collected, for each agent i, in the set N Ji , that is, the set
of agents j whose decision xj explicitly influences Ji.
Since the v-SGNE requires consensus of the dual vari-
ables, we introduce an auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm for all
i ∈ I. The role of z = col(z1, . . . , zN) is to help reaching
consensus and it will be properly defined later in this section.
The auxiliary variable zi and a local copy of the dual variable
λi are shared through the graph Gλ = (I, Eλ). The set of
edges Eλ represents the exchange of the private information
on the dual variables: (i, j) ∈ Eλ if agent i can receive
{λj , zj} from agent j. The set of neighbours of i in Gλ
is indicated with N λi = {j|(j, i) ∈ Eλ} [8], [3]. Since
each agent feasible set implicitly depends on all the other
agents decisions (through the shared constraints), to reach
consensus of the dual variables, all agents must coordinate
and therefore, Gλ must be connected.
Assumption 3: The dual-variable communication graph
Gλ is undirected and connected. 
The weighted adjacency matrix of the dual variables graph
is indicated with W ∈ RN×N . Let L = D −W ∈ RN×N
be the Laplacian matrix associated to W , where D =
diag(d1, . . . , dN ) is the diagonal matrix of the agents degrees
di =
∑N
j=1 wi,j . It follows from Assumption 3 that the
adjacency matrixW and the Laplacian L are both symmetric,
i.e., W = W⊤ and L = L⊤.
To obtain the iterations presented in Algorithm 1, let us
rewrite the KKT conditions in (7) as
0 ∈ T (x,λ) :=
[
NΩ(x) + F(x) +A
⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ)− (Ax− b)
]
, (8)
where T : X × Rm≥0 ⇒ R
n × Rm is a set-valued mapping.
We note that the mapping T can be written as the sum of
two operators:
A :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
F(x)
b
]
B :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x)
NRm
≥0
(λ)
]
+
[
0 A⊤
−A 0
] [
x
λ
]
.
(9)
Then, finding a solution of the game in (3) translates in
finding a zero of the operator T = A + B or equivalently,
x∗ ∈ zer(A+ B).
Let L be the Laplacian matrix of Gλ and set L = L⊗Im ∈
RNm×Nm. Following [8], to force consensus on the dual
variables, we impose the Laplacian constraint Lλ = 0. Then,
to preserve monotonicity, we augment the two operators
A and B introducing the auxiliary variable z. Let A =
diag{A1, . . . , AN} ∈ RNm×n and λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈
RNm and similarly let us define b of suitable dimensions.
Then, the extended operators read as
A¯ :

 xz
λ

7→

 F(x)0
b

+

 00
Lλ


B¯ :

 xz
λ

7→

 NΩ(x)0mN
NRm
≥0
(λ)

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

.
(10)
From now on, we indicate ω = col(x, z,λ). The following
lemma ensure that the zeros of A¯+ B¯ are v-SGNE.
Lemma 1: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. Consider the opera-
tors A and B in (9) and A¯ and B¯ in (10). Then, the following
statements hold.
(i) If ω∗ ∈ zer(A¯ + B¯), then x∗ is a v-SGNE of game
in (3), i.e., x∗ solves the SVI(X ,F) in (5). Moreover
λ∗ = 1N ⊗λ
∗, and (x∗,λ∗) satisfy the KKT condition
in (7) i.e., col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A+ B)
(ii) zer(A+ B) 6= ∅ and zer(A¯+ B¯) 6= ∅
Proof: It follows from [8, Th. 2].
The properties of the operators A¯ and B¯ in (10) depends
on the properties of the mapping F in (4).
Assumption 4: F is β-cocoercive for some β > 0. 
Remark 2: If a function is β-cocoercive, it is also 1/β-
Lipschitz continuous [19, Remark 4.15]. 
A technical discussion on this assumption is postponed to
Section V.
We can now show the necessary monotonicity properties
of the extended operators.
Lemma 2: Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold and let Φ ≻ 0.
Then, A¯ and B¯ in (10) have the following properties.
(i) A¯ is θ-cocoercive where 0 < θ ≤ min
{
1
2d∗ , β
}
and d∗
is the maximum weighted degree of Gλ;
(ii) B¯ is maximally monotone;
(iii) Φ−1A¯ is θτ -cocoercive, with τ = 1|Φ−1| ;
(iv) Φ−1B¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof: It follows from [8, Lem. 5] and [8, Lem. 7].
Since the expected value can be hard to compute, we
take an approximation. At this stage, it is not important to
specify if we use sample average or stochastic approxima-
tion, therefore, in what follows, we replace F in (4) with
an approximation Fˆ , given a vector sample of the random
variable ξ, and A¯ with
Aˆ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
b

+

 00
Lλ

 (11)
Given Aˆ in (11) and B¯ in (10), we can write Algorithm 1
in compact form as
ωk+1 = (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1(ωk − Φ−1Aˆ(2ωk − ωk−1)) (12)
where Φ is the preconditioning matrix. Specifically, let
α−1 = diag{α−11 In1 , . . . , α
−1
N InN } ∈ R
n×n and similarly
σ−1 and ν−1 of suitable dimensions. Then, we have
Φ =

 α−1 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1

 . (13)
By expanding (12) with Aˆ as in (11), B¯ as in (10) and Φ
as in (13), we obtain the iterations in Algorithm 1. We note
that, since Φ + B¯ is lower block triangular, the iterations
of Algorithm 1 are sequential, i.e., λk depends on the last
update xk+1 and zk+1 of the agents strategies and of the
auxiliary variable respectively.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS WITH SAMPLE AVERAGE
APPROXIMATION
Since the distribution of the random variable is unknown,
in the algorithm we have replaced the expected value with its
approximation Fˆ . For the convergence analysis, we use the
sample average approximation (SAA) scheme. We assume
to have access to a pool of i.i.d. samples of the random
variable collected, for all k ∈ N and for each agent i ∈ I,
in the vectors ξki . At each time k, the approximation is
Fˆi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
k
i ) = F
SAA
i (x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
k
i )
=
1
Nk
Nk∑
s=1
∇xiJi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
(s)
i )
(14)
where Nk is the batch size, i.e., the number of sample to
be taken. We define the distance between the expected value
and its approximation as
ǫk = F SAA(xk, ξk)− F(xk).
Since there is no uncertainty in the constraints, we have
ASAA(ω
k, ξk)−A(ωk) = εk = col(ǫk, 0, 0),
where ASAA is the operator Aˆ with approximation FSAA as
in (14). Let us introduce the filtration F = {Fk}, i.e., a
family of σ-algebras such that F0 = σ (X0), for all k ≥ 1,
Fk = σ (X0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) and Fk ⊆ Fk+1 for all k ≥ 0.
The filtration F collects the informations that each agent has
at the beginning of each iteration k. We note that the process
ǫk is adapted to Fk and it satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 5: For al k ≥ 0, E [ǫk|Fk] = 0 a.s.. 
Moreover, the stochastic error has a vanishing second mo-
ment that depends on the increasing number of samples Nk
taken at each iteration.
Assumption 6: There exist c, k0, a > 0 such that, for all
k ∈ N,
Nk ≥ c(k + k0)
a+1. (15)
For all k and C > 0, the stochastic error is such that
E[‖ǫk‖|Fk] ≤
Cσ2
Nk
a.s.. (16)

The bound for the stochastic error in (16) can be obtained as
a consequence of some milder assumptions; we refer to [13,
Lem. 4.2], [14, Lem. 3.12], [15, Lem. 6] for more details.
Concerning the batch size, the law in (15) is standard in the
sample average approximation literature [14, Eq. 11], [17,
Eq. v-SPRG].
Furthermore, since the preconditioning matrix must be
positive definite, we postulate the following assumption on
the parameters.
Assumption 7: Let θ be the cocoercivity constant as in
Lemma 2, τ = 1|Φ−1| ∈ (0,
θ
8 ) and the step sizes α, ν and σ
satisfy, for all i ∈ I,
0 < αi ≤
(
max
j=1,...,ni
{∑m
k=1
|[ATi ]jk|
}
+ τ
)−1
0 < νi ≤ (2di + τ)
−1
0 < σi ≤
(
max
j=1,...,m
{∑ki
k=1
|[Ai]jk|
}
+ 2di + τ
)−1
(17)
where [A⊤i ]jk indicates the entry (j, k) of the matrix A
⊤
i . 
For example, we can obtain conditions (17) imposing that the
preconditioning matrix Φ to be diagonally dominant which,
since it is symmetric, implies that Φ is positive definite [8].
We are now ready to state our convergence result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1-7 hold. Then, the se-
quence (xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 with Fˆ = F
SAA
as in (14) converges a.s. to a v-SGNE of the game in (3).
Proof: The iterations of Algorithm 1 are obtained by
expanding (12) and solving for xk, zk and λk. Therefore,
Algorithm 1 is a SPRG iteration as in (12). The convergence
of the sequence (xk,λk) to a v-GNE of the game in (3)
then follows by [17, Prop. 10] and Lemma 1 since Φ−1A¯ is
cocoercive by Lemma 2.
Remark 3: We note that adopting a SA scheme is not
possible in this case because a vanishing step should be taken
to control the stochastic error [11]. However, having a time-
varying step implies using a variable metric, induced by the
preconditioning matrix Φk which depends on α
k, σk and νk,
for the convergence analysis. Although analysing a variable
metric is possible, the matrix Φk should satisfy additional
assumptions that typically do not hold if the step size is
vanishing [23, Prop. 3.4]. 
V. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION ON WEAK SHARPNESS AND
COCOERCIVITY
The original proof of the SPRG presented in [17] for SVI
shows convergence under the assumption of monotonicity
and weak sharpness. The weak sharpness property was first
introduced to characterize the minima of
min
x∈X
f(x) (18)
with f : X → R¯ [24]. It was presented as en extension of
the concept of strong (or sharp) solution, i.e., for all x∗ ∈
X ∗ = SOL(f,X )
f(x) ≥ f(x∗) + ρ ‖x− x∗‖ ,
which holds if there is only one minimum. For generalizing
non-unique solutions, the following definition was proposed
in [24]: a set X ∗ is a set of weak sharp minima for the
function f if, for all x ∈ X and x∗ ∈ X ∗,
f(x) ≥ f(x∗) + ρ dist(x,X ∗) (19)
where dist(x,X ∗) = infx∗∈X ∗ ‖x− x∗‖. We note that a
strong solution is also a weak sharp minimum while the
contrary holds only if the solution is unique [24].
The concept was later extended to variational inequalities
in [25], using the formal definition
− F(x∗) ∈ int
(⋂
x∈X∗
[TX (x) ∩NX∗(x)]
◦
)
, (20)
which was already proved to be equivalent to (19) for the
problem in (18) when F(x∗) = ∇f(x∗).
Unfortunately, the characterization in (20) is hard to use
in a convergence proof. Therefore, more practical conditions
have been proposed. The first one [25] relies on the gap
function and it reads as
G(x) = max
y∈X
〈F(y), x− y〉 ≥ ρ dist(x −X ∗). (21)
Another condition, used in the convergence proof of the
SPRG [17], was proposed in [12]:
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ ρ dist(x,X ∗), (22)
for all x∗ ∈ X ∗ and x ∈ X . For the weak sharpness
definition in (20) to be equivalent to (21) and (22), the (pseu-
dogradient) mapping should have the F-unique property, i.e.,
F(SOL(F,X )) should be at most a singleton [18, Section
2.3.1]. The class of operators that certainly have this property
is that of monotone+ operators, namely, a monotone mapping
F such that for all x,y ∈ X
〈F (y)− F (x),y − x〉 = 0 ⇒ F (y) = F (x).
If a mapping is monotone+, then (20) is equivalent to (21)
and (22) [25, Thm. 4.1],[26, Prop. 2].
The monotone+ property does not necessarily hold for the
extended operator A¯ in (10), even if it holds for F. However,
it holds if the operator is cocoercive [18, Def. 2.3.9]. These
considerations motivate our assumption. For more details on
monotone+ operators and the weak sharpness property, we
refer to [27], [28], [25], [29].
We conclude this section with some examples showing
that the condition in (22) may hold also if the mapping is
not monotone+ and that the domains are relevant for the
validity of the assumption.
Example 1: [25] Consider the variational inequality in (5)
where F (x) = col(−x2, 2x1) and X = [0, 1]2. The mapping
F is pseudomonotone but not monotone+ onX . The solution
set is X ∗ = {x ∈ X : x2 = 0} and it holds that
G(x) = max
y∈X
〈F (y),x− y〉
= max
y∈X
−x1y2 − y1y2 + 2x2y1
= 2x2 = 2dist(x,X
∗).
(23)
Therefore, X ∗ satisfies (21) with ρ = 2 but, for any x∗ ∈
X
∗, [TX (x
∗) ∩ NX∗(x∗)]◦ = {x∗2 ≤ 0} and −F (x
∗) /∈⋂
x∗∈X [TX (x
∗) ∩NX∗(x∗)]◦. Thus, the solution set X
∗ is
not weakly sharp. 
Example 2: Consider the mapping F (x) = col(−x2, x1)
and the associate variational inequality in (5) with X =
[0, 1]2. Then the mapping F is monotone but not monotone+
on X . The solution set is X ∗ = {x ∈ X : x2 = 0} and,
similarly to (23), the conditions (21) and (22) hold.
Now, let X = R2. In this case, there is only one solution
and X ∗ = {02}. However, (22) reads as
〈F (0),x〉 = 0 ≥ ρ dist(x,X ∗) = ‖x‖
which is false. 
VI. CONVERGENCE UNDER UNIQUENESS OF SOLUTION
In light of the considerations in Section V, we know
that a unique solution is also a weak solution and that (22)
may hold even if the mapping is not monotone+. Therefore,
here we consider the case of merely monotone operators
but with unique solution and prove that the proposed (non-
preconditioned) Algorithm 2 converges to a v-SGNE.
Algorithm 2 Stochastic Relaxed Forward Backward (SRFB)
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1): Updates
x˜ki = 2x
k
i − x
k−1
i
z˜ki = 2z
k
i − z
k−1
i
λ˜ki = 2λ
k
i − λ
k−1
i
(2): Receives xkj for all j ∈ N
J
i and z
k
j , λ
k
j for j ∈ N
λ
i , then
updates:
xk+1i = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(x˜
k
i , x˜
k
−i, ξ
k
i ) +A
⊤
i λ˜
k
i )]
zk+1i = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )
λk+1i = projRm≥0{λ
k
i + τi(Aix˜
k
i − bi)
− τ
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z˜
k
i − z˜
k
j )− (λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )]}
Unlike Algorithm 1, in Algorithm 2 also z˜ should be
updated, but only one communication round is required.
To obtain the iterates in Algorithm 2, a different splitting
should be considered. Specifically, let
C¯:

 xz
λ

7→

 F(x)0
Lλ + b

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ


D¯:

 xz
λ

7→

 NΩ(x)0
NRm
≥0
(λ)

 .
(24)
Lemma 1 guarantees that the zeros of C¯+ D¯ are the same
as the zeros of T in (8).
Since the distribution of the random variable is unknown,
we replace C¯ with
Cˆ :

 (x, ξ)z
λ

7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
Lλ + b

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

 .
(25)
where Fˆ is an approximation of the expected value mapping
F in (4) given some realizations of the random vector ξ.
Then, Algorithm 2 in compact form reads similarly to
Algorithm 1:
ωk+1 = (Id+Φ−1D¯)−1(ωk − Φ−1Cˆ(2ωk − ωk−1)) (26)
where Φ ≻ 0 contains the inverse of step size sequences
Φ = diag(α−1, ν−1, σ−1), (27)
and α−1, ν−1, σ−1 are diagonal matrices. We note that Φ is
not a preconditioning matrix in this case.
Now, to ensure that C¯ and D¯ have the properties that
we use for the convergence result, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 8: F as in (4) is monotone and ℓF-Lipschitz
continuous for some ℓF > 0. 
Then, the two operators C¯ and D¯ in (24) have the following
properties.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 1 and 8 hold and let Φ ≻ 0.
Then, C¯ and D¯ in (24) have the following properties.
(i) C¯ is monotone and ℓC¯-Lipschitz continuous.
(ii) The operator D¯ is maximally monotone.
(iii) Φ−1C¯ is monotone and ℓΦ-Lipschitz continuous.
(iv) Φ−1D¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof: it follows from [8] and [15].
To guarantee that the weak sharpness property holds, we
assume to have a strong solution.
Assumption 9: The SVI in (5) has a unique solution. 
We can now state the convergence result.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1-3 and 5-8 hold. Then, the
sequence (xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 with Fˆ = F
SAA
as in (14) converges a.s. to a v-SGNE of the game in (3).
Proof: The iterations of Algorithm 2 are obtained by
expanding (26) and solving for xk, zk and λk. Therefore,
Algorithm 2 is a SPRG iteration as in (26). The convergence
of the sequence (xk,λk) to a v-GNE of the game in (3)
then follows by [17, Prop. 10] and Lemma 1 since Φ−1C¯ is
monotone by Lemma 3 and has a unique solution.
VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Let us propose some numerical evaluations to validate the
analysis: an illustrative example and a Nash-Cournot game.
While the first comes from Example 2, the second is a
realistic application to an electricity market with capacity
constraints [8], [17].
All the simulations are performed on Matlab R2019b with
a 2,3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB LPDDR3 RAM.
A. Illustrative example
We start with the stochastic counterpart of Example 2, that
is, a monotone (non-cocoercive) stochastic Nash equilibrium
problem with two players with strategies x1 and x2 respec-
tively, and pseudogradient mapping
F(x) =
[
0 R1(ξ)
−R2(ξ) 0
] [
x1
x2
]
.
The random variables are sampled from a normal distribution
with mean 1 and finite variance, following Assumption 6.
The problem is unconstrained and the optimal solution is
(0, 0). The step sizes are taken to be the highest possible and
we compare our SpPRG with the stochastic distributed pre-
conditioned forward–backward (SpFB) which is guaranteed
to converge under the same cocoercivity assumption with the
SAA scheme [15].
Figure 1 shows that the SpFB does not converge while,
due to the uniqueness of the solution, the SpPRG does.
100 101 102 103
k
10-4
10-2
100
102
SpFB
SpPRG
Fig. 1. Relative distance of the primal variable from the solution.
B. Nash-Cournot game with market capacity constraints
Now, we consider an electricity market problem that can
be casted as a network Cournot game with markets capacity
constraints [8], [3], [17]. We consider a set of N = 20
companies selling their product to a set of m = 7 markets.
Each generator decides the quantity of energy xi to deliver
to the ni markets it is connected with. Each company i
has a local constraint, i.e., a production limit, of the form
0 < xi < γi where each component of γi is randomly
drawn from [1, 1.5]. Each company has a cost of production
ci(xi) = 1.5xi+ qi, where qi is a given constant, that is not
uncertain. For simplicity, we assume the transportation costs
are zero.
Each market j has a bounded capacity bj , randomly drawn
from [0.5, 1]. The collective constraints are then given by
Ax ≤ b where A = [A1, . . . , AN ] and each Ai specifies in
which market each company participates.
The prices of the markets are collected in P : Rm×Ξ→
Rm. The uncertainty variable, ξ which represents the demand
uncertainty, appears in this functional. P is supposed to be
a linear function and reads as P (ξ) = P¯ (ξ) − DAx. Each
component of P¯ = col(P¯1(ξ), . . . , P¯7(ξ)) is taken with a
normal distribution with mean 3 and finite variance. The
entries of D are randomly taken in [0.5, 1].
The cost function of each agent is then given by
Ji(xi, x−i, ξ) = ci(xi)− E[P (ξ)
⊤(Ax)Aixi].
and it is influenced by the variables of the companies selling
in the same market as in [8, Fig. 1]. The dual variables graph
is a cycle graph with the addiction of the edges (2, 15) and
(6, 13) [8].
We simulate the SpFB, the forward-backward-forward
(SFBF) and the extragradient (SEG) algorithms to make a
comparison with our SPRG and SpPRG, using the SAA
scheme. The parameters α, ν and σ are taken to be the
highest possible that guarantee convergence.
As a measure of the distance from the solution, we con-
sider the residual, res(xk) =
∥∥xk − projC(xk − F (xk))∥∥,
which is equal zero if and only if x is a solution. The plots
in Fig. 2 shows how the residual varies in the number of
iterations while the plot in Fig. 3 shows the number of times
that the pseudogradient mapping is computed. As one can
see from the plots, the performances of SpPRG and SPRG
are very similar. The difference in the trajectory is related
to the different step sizes which depend on the Lipschitz
constant of A¯ in (10) and C¯ in (24) respectively.
100
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Fig. 2. Relative distance of the primal variable from the solution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The stochastic projected reflected gradient algorithm can
be applied to stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium seek-
ing. To guarantee convergence to a solution and to obtain
100
# pseudgradient evaluations
10-4
10-2
100
102
SFBF
SpFB
SEG
SPRG
SpPRG
Fig. 3. Relative distance of the primal variable from the solution.
a distributed algorithm, preconditioning should be used and
the pseudogradient mapping should be cocoercive. However,
should the equilibrium be unique, the cocoercivity assump-
tion can be reduced to mere monotonicity.
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